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Recent Decisions
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FREEDOM OF THE PRESS-RIGHT OF PRI-
VACY-PUBLICATION OF TRUE INFORMATION ON THE PUBLIC
RECORD-The Supreme Court of.the United States has held that a
state may not base a cause of action for invasion of privacy on the
publication of accurate information obtained from judicial records
open to the public, because crime, criminal prosecutions and judi-
cial proceedings are events of legitimate concern to the public which
fall within the media's duty of responsible news coverage.
Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
In August, 1971, seventeen-year-old Cynthia Cohn was raped; she
died of suffocation shortly thereafter. Six youths were indicted in
Fulton County, Georgia, for her rape and murder. The murder
charges were dropped, and in a court proceeding eight months after
the incident five of the defendants pleaded guilty tp rape or at-
tempted rape. The court accepted the guilty pleas, sentenced the
defendants, and set a trial date for the defendant pleading not
guilty.' Tom Wassell, a general assignment reporter for WSB-TV of
Atlanta, was assigned to cover the proceedings and learned the
identity of the rape victim from indictments shown to him at his
request by the county clerk of courts, who was present in the court-
room. In Wassell's report, televised later that day and the next, he
named Cynthia Cohn as the victim of the rape.' A month after the
broadcast, Cynthia's father filed a one million dollar damage suit 3
against the reporter and Cox Broadcasting Corporation, the owner
of WSB-TV. The cause of action was based on a Georgia statute
1. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 231 Ga. 60, 61, 200 S.E.2d 127, 128 (1973).
2. The broadcast's relevant portion began:
Six youths went on trial today for the murder-rape of a teenaged girl. The six Sandy
Springs high school boys were charged with murder and rape in the death of seventeen
year old Cynthia Cohn following a drinking party last August 18. The tragic death of
the high school girl shocked the entire Sandy Springs community. Today the six boys
had their day in court. . . .The prosecutor .. .said the girl had apparently drank
Isici a considerable amount of vodka attending a private party. He said the girl was
taken to a wooded area and raped. She passed out. . . and the liquids in her stomach
were forced upward causing suffocation. . . . [Wlhether the rape caused the death,
he said, would be difficult to prove. . . .The DA told the court the girl's family felt
that a lenient five year sentence would serve justice.
Id. at 62, 200 S.E.2d at 129.
3. NEWSWEEK, March 17, 1975, at 66.
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which made it a misdemeanor to publish or broadcast the name of
a rape victim.' Cohn claimed his right to privacy had been violated
by the broadcast of his daughter's name. 5
The trial court rejected the publisher's defense of privilege under
Georgia law and the first and fourteenth amendments, held the
statute gave a civil remedy to those injured by its violation, and
granted summary judgment as to liability.' On appeal, the Georgia
Supreme Court held the statute, which exacted criminal penalties
only, did not create a civil cause of action for invasion of privacy;
however, the complaint did state a cause of action for invasion of
the common law right of privacy, which existed in Georgia indepen-
dently of the statute.7 The case was remanded for a determination
of liability because summary judgment was deemed inappropriate.'
On a motion for rehearing on whether disclosure of the victim's
name was privileged as a matter of public interest, the Georgia
Supreme Court held the statute was a declaration of policy by the
legislature that a rape victim's name was not a matter of public
interest. The court concomitantly sustained the constitutionality of
this legislative choice as a legitimate limitation on the right of free
expression.9 The United States Supreme Court held on appeal" that
the freedom of expression guaranteed by the first and fourteenth
amendments precluded a state from imposing civil liability for pub-
lication of accurate information properly obtained from official re-
cords open to the public."
4. GA. CoiD ANN. §26-9901 (1972) made it a misdemeanor for any person or news media
to publish, broadcast or televise the name or identity of a female who was the victim of a
rape or an assault with intent to rape.
5. A prior Georgia ruling recognized that although the right of privacy is personal and does
not survive the individual, relatives of the deceased may sue in their own right because
unwarranted publicity reflects on them. 231 Ga. at 64, 200 S.E.2d at 131, citing Bazemore v.
Savannah Hosp., 171 Ga. 257, 155 S.E. 194 (1930) (parents of child whose medical informa-
tion was released by hospital to news media). See also Green, Relational Interests, 29 ILL. L.
RF\v. 460, 486-87 (1934).
6. 231 Ga. at 60, 200 S.E.2d at 129.
7. Id. at 62, 200 S.E.2d at 130. Georgia was the first state to recognize a common law right
of privacy. Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905) involved
the appropriation of a personal photograph for advertising purposes.
8. 231 Ga. at 67, 200 S.E.2d at 133.
9. Id.
10. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975). Justice White wrote the major-
ity opinion, in which seven Justices concurred; Justices Powell and Douglas wrote separate
opinions and Chief Justice Burger concurred in the judgment without opinion. Justice
Rehnquist's position on the privacy issue is unknown because he dissented on jurisdictional
grounds. See note 11 infra.
Vol. 14: 507
Recent Decisions
11. Before reaching the merits of the case, the Court faced a significant question regarding
its jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1970), which provides:
Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a
decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court as follows . . . (2) By
appeal, where is drawn in question the validity of a statute on the ground of its being
repugnant to the Constitution . . . and the decision is in favor of its validity.
Id. The Court first noted the Georgia statute had been "drawn in question" because the
Georgia court's characterization of the statute as a declaration of state policy that publication
of a rape victim's name was not protected by the first amendment had directly affected the
merits of the action. 420 U.S. at 476. The major discussion, however, dealt with the require-
ment of finality articulated in the statute. In four categories of cases, the Court has treated
a state decision as final for purposes of § 1257 and has settled the federal issue involved,
despite the pendency of further state proceedings. In the first category are cases in which
further proceedings are forthcoming but the outcome is preordained, as where the appellant
has no defense other than the federal claim: Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966) (granting
jurisdiction where the defendant was charged with violation of a criminal statute prohibiting
election day editorials on a controversial issue). 420 U.S. at 479. In the second are cases in
which the federal issue has been decided by the highest state court and will survive regardless
of the outcome of future state court proceedings: Radio Station WOW, Inc. v. Johnson, 326
U.S. 120, 126-27 (1945) (Nebraska Supreme Court's decision on a federal issue was reviewable
despite the fact an accounting was also ordered). 420 U.S. at 480. The third category involves
situations where a federal claim has been finally decided by the state court and further
proceedings will follow, but later review of the federal issue will be foreclosed by state law
which will not permit reconsideration of the federal question: North Dakota State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Snyder's Drug Stores, Inc., 414 U.S. 156 (1973) (question of the validity of a
statute specifying ownership requirements for pharmacies would not survive on remand,
whatever the result of state administrative proceedings); California v. Stewart, 384 U.S. 436
(1966) (granting an appeal by the state where a new trial might have resulted in acquittal).
420 U.S. at 481-82. In the fourth category, the federal issue has been decided by the highest
state court with further proceeding pending, but a decision by the Court would determine
whether any further litigiation would be needed at all: Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (granting an appeal of a state ruling upholding a statute and
remanding for trial and appropriate relief). 420 U.S. at 484-85.
The Court thought Cox had elements of the first, third and fourth categories. Id. at 484-
86. citing Mills v. Alabama, supra at 221-22, and Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,
supra at 247 n.6. The Georgia Supreme Court's decision on the federal issue of whether the
first and fourteenth amendments precluded states from forbidding publication of the name
of a rape victim was final because the question would not be subject to further review by the
Georgia Supreme Court. A decision in the publisher's favor would end the litigation; failure
to decide the question, however, would force the Georgia press to operate under a ruling that
left the constitutionality of the statute in serious doubt. The Court found reaching the merits
at this time consistent with the "pragmatic approach it has followed in determining finality."
420 U.S. at 486.
In his dissent, Justice Rehnquist argued for dismissal because the appeal did not present
a final judgment or decree. He felt the line of cases beginning with Radio Station WOW, Inc.
v. Johnson, supra, and including Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (refusal to issue an
injunction on first amendment grounds where no arrests or indictments had been issued,
illustrated the need for strict adherence to the finality rule to further harmonious state-federal
relations. 420 U.S. at 503-05 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). More importantly in Justice Rehnqu-
ist's view, the standard set forth in Cox went beyond established exceptions to the finality
rule and created a formless exception with no basis in the language of § 1257 or in the efficient
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DECISION OF THE COURT
Justice White, writing for the majority, acknowledged that some
form of a right to privacy existed in most jurisdictions. The "tort of
public disclosure" in Cox, however, conflicted with the press's con-
stitutional right to disseminate truthful information.' 2 The first
amendment required that truth was a complete defense in defama-
tion actions brought by public officials'" and public figures." In
regard to private persons, however, the Court had expressly left
open the question whether truthful publication could be constitu-
tionally prohibited.'5 This prior hesitation, as well as the significant
social values served by the right to privacy, counseled caution in
balancing the interests of privacy and a free press.
Rather than address the broad proposition urged by the appellant
that publication of truthful matters might never expose the media
to liability, regardless of the offensiveness or embarrassment to the
ordinary individual,'" the Court limited its discussion to liability for
publication of the name of a rape victim obtained from generally
available public records.' 7 Because of their limited capability to
observe the operations of government firsthand, citizens necessarily
rely upon press reports of governmental proceedings. In particular,
crime, prosecutions and attendant judicial proceedings are events
of legitimate concern which the media is obliged to report com-
pletely and accurately.'8 Official records and documents which are
administration of justice. Id. at 507. He distinguished Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tor-
nillo, supra, and Mills v. Alabama, supra, because they involved "core" first amendment
considerations of the press's role in free political discourse, as opposed to the comparatively
insignificant prohibition on merely reporting the name of a rape victim. 420 U.S. at 508-09.
The instant decision, Justice Rehnquist argued, abandoned the principle that the Court will
not anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it. Id.
at 509.
12. 420 U.S. at 488-89.
13. In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964), the Court held that
in a defamation action brought by a public official the plaintiff must prove a false statement
was made with either knowledge it was false or with reckless disregard for its truth or falsity.
falsity.
14. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967) extended the New York Times rule
to persons who were not public officials but were involved in significant public issues or
events.
15. 420 U.S. at 490.
16. Id. at 489.
17. Id. at 491.
18. Id. at 492-93, quoting Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947). See Times-Picayune
Publishing Corp. v. Schulingkamp, 419 U.S. 1301 (1974) (stay of restraining order on news
coverage in a murder-rape prosecution); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 334 (1966) (a
Vol. 14: 507
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accessible to the public and contain such information are the "basic
data of governmental operations."' 9
Truthful disclosure of the name of a rape victim contained none
of the indicia of those categories of speech which a state may consti-
tutionally proscribe.20 The Georgia cause of action imposed sanc-
tions on pure expression and invited timidity and self-censorship on
the part of the press, which would be torn between fully informing
the public, or remaining within the law.2' The press's responsibility
to report judicial proceedings reflects the public interest in knowing
about such events;2 the state manifests its agreement that the pub-
lic interest is being served and a public benefit derived from dissem-
ination of information contained in official court records by placing
them in the public domain. The interest in privacy and its accompa-
nying restrictions are less compelling when the information is al-
ready a matter of public record. Since freedom of the press avails
people of information they must have to function as citizens, a state
may not impose sanctions on the publication of truthful matters
contained in official court records which are open for public inspec-
tion. 3 Justice White noted that states might protect the interest of
free "press does not simply publish information . . . but guards against the miscarriage of
justice .. .Ithroughl extensive public scrutiny and criticism").
19. 420 U.S. at 491-92.
20. Id. at 495. The balancing of the state interest and freedom of expression has been the
traditional test applied where the expression was coupled with conduct or so-called "fighting
words." See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968) (when "speech" and
"nonspeech" are combined, a sufficient governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech
element may justify limitations on first amendment freedoms); Chaplinsky v. New Hamp-
shire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (upholding a state statute forbidding words likely to aggravate
an average person or likely to cause a breach of the peace).
21. 420 U.S. at 496. See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 389 (1967); Speiser v. Randall,
357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958). These decisions held that the first amendment prohibits a state rule
that would be likely to cause self-censorship or suppression of legitimate information the press
would otherwise publish.
22. 420 U.S. at 493-94, quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652D, 652B, comment
c at 114 (Tent. Draft No. 13, 1967).
23. 420 U.S. at 496. Justice White suggested the states should apply a "balance of inter-
est" test to determine whether the interest of privacy outweighs the interest of the public to
know. Such a determination by the states would present a constitutional problem apart from
the first amendment where the Court determined a defendant was entitled to sixth amend-
ment protections: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial ...to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. Public identification
of the victim may be necessary for the preparation of a defendant's case; for example, it could
aid in finding witnesses who could relate the circumstances of the alleged crime or a matter
relative to the defense such as consent in the case of rape. Franklin, A Constitutional Problem
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privacy regarding such information by avoiding public documenta-
tion or restricting public access to governmental records, but he
specifically reserved discussion of the constitutional questions
raised by such a state policy.24
Justice Powell concurred in the opinion of the Court and its ra-
tionale on the specific issue presented by the facts. However, he
disagreed with Justice White's assertion that the Court had yet to
deal with the question whether truth is a required defense in defa-
mation actions brought by private individuals. 5 Justice Powell
noted that the rule he announced in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,"6
which permitted states to impose a standard other than strict liabil-
ity in defamation actions by private persons, supplanted the New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan" rule of knowing falsehood or reckless
disregard for truth as applied to private individuals, and necessarily
implied that truth be recognized as a complete defense."8
COMMENTARY ON THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY
There are four recognized classes of actions for invasion of pri-
vacy: unreasonable physical intrusion into another's private life;
appropriation of another's name or likeness for purposes of trade;
publicity which places another in a false light before the public; and
in Privacy Protection: Legal Inhibitions on Reporting of Fact, 16 STAN. L. REV. 107, 137
(1963)1 hereinafter cited as Franklin].
24. Although the Court did not rule on state attempts to limit access to news or informa-
tion by law or regulations in Cox, the Court has previously distinguished the first amendment
right of the press to publish information it obtains from the press's more limited right of
access to governmental information. See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974) (upheld a state
regulation prohibiting news interviews with prisoners on the ground the privilege was not
given to the public generally); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (news media's first
amendment privilege does not include the right to gather news, and a newsman may be
compelled to reveal confidential sources to a grand jury); New York Times Co. v. United
States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (Court distinguished the constitutional right to publish govern-
mental documents from the asserted right to obtain them). See also McLaughlin v. Philadel-
phia Newspapers, Inc., 348 A.2d 376 (Pa. 1975) (first amendment not violated by denying
newspapers access to impounded court records).
25. 420 U.S. at 497-98 (Powell, J., concurring).
26. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
27. 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964). See note 14 supra.
28. 420 U.S. at 499 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Douglas also concurred in the
judgment but would have based the result on the broader proposition that the first and
fourteenth amendments prohibit the use of state law to impose damages for merely discussing




unreasonable publicity of another's private life.29 Cox belongs in this
last category, which includes publication of accurate facts in edi-
torial or news reporting rather than in advertising space.30 Since the
first amendment protects the press, the question of what is legiti-
mate news coverage under this form of privacy action has constitu-
tional dimensions as well. The constitutional dilemma posed by
recognition of the tort is rather recent since, unlike defamation,
privacy was not recognized as a common law right at the time the
Constitution was written. The right evolved from a seminal article,
The Right to Privacy,3 written in 1890 by Warren and Brandeis.
Since the proposal of the tort by Warren and Brandeis, 2 changing
societal values have affected the very concept of privacy. Disclo-
sures that were shocking when the right of privacy was first sug-
gested now appear daily in the most prestigious newspapers. But
despite increasing acceptance of the fact that all persons are public
figures to some extent within their own communities, the notion
lingers that everyone, however notorious, is entitled to a zone of
privacy within which no person may wander uninvited.
Since the recognition of the tort of invasion of privacy, courts and
commentators have attempted to reconcile these contrary notions,
suggesting the following essential elements of a cause of action: the
29. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652A-E (Tent. Draft No. 13, 1967). The same
categories are suggested in W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 117, at 804 (4th ed. 1971) and Prosser,
Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Privacy].
30. This category has been described as the mass communications tort of invasion of
privacy, since it particularly subjects mass communications to liability. Kalven, Privacy in
Tort Law-Were Warren & Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoB. 326, 333 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as Kalven].
31. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890) [hereinafter
cited as Warren & Brandeis].
32. In 1890, Warren and Brandeis complained the press had "invaded the sacred pre-
cincts" of private life, so that "[glossip is no longer the resource of the idle . . . but has
become a trade, which is pursued with industry as well as effrontery." Id. at 195-96. One
student of journalism noted this period was marked by technological advances that made
mass communications possible for the first time. These advances helped create the period of
"yellow journalism" personified by Joseph Pulitzer and William Randolph Hearst. Their
mass circulation newspapers used screaming headlines, often in color, faked pictures and
fraudulent stories in the guise of news. W. SWINDLER, PROBLEMS OF LAW IN JOURNALISM 245-46
(1955). Despite the relatively infrequent use of these techniques today, commentators disa-
gree on the meaning of the right to privacy and its application to present-day mass communi-
cations. Compare Kalven, supra note 30, at 327-31, suggesting the right to privacy was simply
an idea whose time came and went with "yellow journalism," with Wade, Defamation and
the Right of Privacy, 15 VAND. L. REV. 1093 (1962), predicting invasion of privacy actions will
eventually supplant defamation actions..
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disclosure must publicize private affairs in which the public has no
legitimate interest or concern;" it must be an unwarranted invasion
without waiver or constitutional privilege;34 it must cause mental
anguish or shame to a person of ordinary sensibilities. 31 The right
of privacy has generally been considered lost or waived where there
is consent to publication, where the person voluntarily places him-
self in the public limelight, or when the individual is an actor in or
subject of a newsworthy event.36 Thus, if the facts disclosed were
"newsworthy," the information was subject to the public's right to
know-and was not private at all.
It has been difficult to articulate a standard defining newsworthi-
ness or the public interest." Warren and Brandeis 3 and some
33. Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245 (1974); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385
U.S. 374 (1967). See text at notes 48-50 infra.
34. Edmiston v. Time, Inc., 257 F. Supp. 22, 26 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (finding a constitutional
privilege to publish reports of judicial proceedings); Frith v. Associated Press, 176 F. Supp.
671, 676 (E.D.S.C. 1959) (finding waiver where plaintiffs were the subjects of arrest warrants);
Berg v. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 79 F. Supp. 957, 962 (D. Minn. 1948) (privilege to
report judicial proceedings).
35. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 867 (1939); Privacy, supra note 29, at 390. Commentators
question whether the publisher must in fact know or have reason to know of the disclosure's
offensiveness. Prosser suggests merely showing offensiveness to the ordinary individual is
enough. Id. at 396. That standard, however, approximates strict liability without fault, which
the Court has disapproved in defamation actions in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
323, 347 (1974). See notes 52-58 and accompanying text infra. Feinberg, Recent Developments
in the Lau, of Privacy, 48 COLUM. L. REV. 713, 715 (1948) suggests serious, unreasonable,
unwarranted and offensive interference with another's private affairs involves more than mere
publication of facts and information sufficient to outrage a community's notion of decency.
See also Kalven, supra note 30, at 334.
36. See, e.g., Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 113 F.2d 806, 809 (2d Cir. 1940) (former child
prodigy's later life as a reclusive bookkeeper was a legitimate matter of public concern); Neff
v. Time, Inc., 44 U.S.L.W. 2373 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 27, 1976) (deliberate publication of offensive
photograph taken at public event with subject's knowledge and implied consent is privi-
leged); Frith v. Associated Press, 176 F. Supp. 671, 674 (E.D.S.C. 1959) (plaintiffs lost their
right to privacy because they were subjects of arrest warrants and their photographs were
distributed to press at news conference); Berg v. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 79 F. Supp.
957, 961 (D. Minn. 1948) (plaintiff's photograph taken during court recess); Melvin v. Reid,
112 Cal. App. 285, 287-88, 297 P. 9i, 92-93 (Dist. Ct. App. 1931) (no action where consent is
implied by prominence and involvement in news events or public discussion in which the
public has a rightful interest).
37. One of the first definitions of "news" explained it as "apparently authentic reports of
current events of interest." Associated Press v. International News Serv., 245 F. 244, 248 (2d
Cir. 1917), aff'd, 248 U.S. 215 (1918); accord, Metter v. Los Angeles Examiner, 35 Cal. App.
2d 304, 312, 95 P.2d 491, 496 (Dist. Ct. App. 1939); Jenkins v. News Syndicate Co., 128 Misc.
284, 285, 219 N.Y.S. 196, 198 (Sup. Ct. 1926). Various attempts to reach a workable standard
are discussed in Comment, The Right of Privacy: Normative.Descriptive Confusion in the
Defense of Newsworthiness, 30 U. CI. L. REV. 722 (1963). For applications of the public
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courts 9 have asked whether the public needed to know the facts to
function in a democratic society. The prevailing view, however, has
been derived from a definition by the Supreme Court, that news in
it most fundamental sense is what interests people.45 Hence, publi-
cation of truthful facts concerning persons caught in the vortex of
crimes, criminal investigations and prosecutions has generally been
found permissible.4 Moreover, courts have not distinguished be-
tween innocent victims of crime and persons who have voluntarily
thrust themselves into such newsworthy events.42
interest test see Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967) (opening of a Broadway play); Time,
Inc. v. Johnston, 448 F.2d 378 (4th Cir. 1971) (former professional basketball star); Time, Inc.
v. McLaney, 406 F.2d 565 (5th Cir. 1969) (reputed gambling figure); Spen v. Time, Inc., 324
F. Supp. 1201 (W.D. Pa. 1971) (religion); Ragano v. Time, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 1005 (M.D. Fla.
1969), af'd, 427 F.2d 219 (5th Cir. 1970) (organized crime); Bon Air Hotel, Inc. v. Time, Inc.
295 F. Supp. 704 (S.D. Ga. 1969), aff'd, 426 F.2d 858 (5th Cir. 1970) (hotel accomodations
for a major golf tournament).
38. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 31, at 214-15.
39. See, e.g., Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 231 Ga. 60, 64, 200 S.E.2d 127, 132 (1973);
Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 4 Cal. 3d 529, 534-37, 483 P.2d 34, 39, 93 Cal. Rptr. 866,
869-72 (1971); cf. Barber v. Time, Inc., 348 Mo. 1199, 159 S.W.2d 291 (1942), which held that
the medical history of a woman with a rare ailment that made her a starving glutton may
have been in the public interest, but publication of her photograph while in a hospital and
against her wishes was not.
40. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967). Twenty years earlier the Court had
decided the first amendment precluded courts from placing value judgments on the quality
of or "play" given to news events. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948) (held invalid a
statute providing criminal penalties for publications which sensationalized crime news). The
rationale may be that while there are vast differences in the quality of newspapers and
reporting, it is impossible to agree on what is reasonable and proper in the controversy-filled
world of newspaper reporting. Beaney, The Right to Privacy and American Law, 31 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 253, 257 (1966).
41. See, e.g., Wagner v. Fawcett Publications, 307 F.2d 409 (7th Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
372 U.S. 909 (1963) (plaintiff was a witness in a murder trail); Jenkins v. Dell Publishing Co.,
251 F.2d 447 (3d Cir. 1958) (homicide victim's family identified in a story about a juvenile
gang charged with the murder); Frith v. Associated Press, 176 F. Supp. 671 (E.D.S.C. 1959)
(governor distributed photographs of plaintiffs, for whom arrest warrants had been issued);
Bernstein v. National Broadcasting Co., 129 F. Supp. 817 (D.D.C.' 1955), aff'd, 232 F.2d 369
(D.C. Cir. 1956) (documentary on plaintiff's trial and subsequent exoneration for murder);
Garner v. Triangle Publications, 97 F. Supp. 546 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) (plaintiff's murder trial);
Berg v. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 79 F. Supp. 957 (D. Minn. 1948) (plaintiff's suits
for divorce and custody); Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 4 Cal. 3d 529, 483 P.2d 34, 93 Cal.
Rptr. 866 (1971).
42. In Nappier v. Standard Life Ins. Co., 322 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1963) and Edmiston v.
Time, Inc., 257 F. Supp. 22 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), female victims of sexual attacks were identified
in news stories. Nappier upheld S.C. CODE ANN. § 1 -81 (1962), a statute similar to that in
Cox, and granted a cause of action for invasion of privacy, but specifically noted that no
constitutional defense had been raised. 322 F.2d at 505. In Edmiston, a magazine published
an account of the rape trial, titled "A Girl's Reputation," which included blunt remarks by
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At times, newsworthiness has been almost presumed when an
event has been reported in the public record;43 this does not neces-
sarily mean, however, that the subject was newsworthy or the publi-
cation was in the public interest. In two leading California deci-
sions, Melvin v. Reid44 and Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Association,
Inc.," the courts found lack of newsworthiness was the controlling
factor in recognizing causes of action for invasion of privacy. The
courts minimized the public records factor, because the publication
of names of persons involved in crimes years before was only tangen-
tially related to the subject matter or central theme of the stories.
The name disclosures were unnecessary and contributed nothing to
the public's interest in the reported events."
the trial judge. The court conceded the privilege to publish newsworthy events, including
judicial proceedings, could not be unlimited, but declined to allow a cause of action because
persons even unwittingly involved in crime became public figures for a time. 257 F. Supp. at
27.
Two other states have rape victims' identification statutes such as those in Cox and
Nappier: FLA. STAT. ANN. § 994.03 (Supp. 1975), amending FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 794.03-.04
(1965); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 942.02 (1958). The constitutionality of criminal prosecution for
violation of such a statute has been challenged only once; the statute was upheld. State v.
Evjue, 253 Wis. 146, 33 N.W.2d 305 (1948). The publisher, however, was acquitted in a
nonjury trial on the particular facts, and the Wisconsin Supreme Court later upheld the
acquittal. State v. Evjue, 254 Wis. 581, 37 N.W.2d 50 (1949). The story at issue concerned a
murder committed during a rape. For a history of the statutes and commentary see Franklin,
supra note 23, at 121-37.
43. In Hubbard v. Journal Publishing Co., 69 N.M. 473, 368 P.2d 147 (1962), an action
for invasion of privacy brought by the female victim of a sexual attack was denied on the
ground the newspaper was privileged to publish a verbatim account of records which were
open to the public. Id. at 473, 368 P.2d at 148.
44. 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91 (Dist. Ct. App. 1931) (plaintiff, a reformed prostitute,
was allowed damages for use of her maiden name in a film based on her past life as revealed
in the public records of a murder trial in which she was the defendant).
45. 4 Cal. 3d 529, 483 P.2d 34, 93 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1971) (plaintiff's true name and involve-
ment in a hijacking eleven years before were used to illustrate hijacking as a national problem
in a feature article).
46. Id. at 537, 483 P.2d at 40, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 872; Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285,
287-88, 297 P. 91, 93 (Dist. Ct. App. 1931). Both cases can be distinguished from Cox, since
the names published were not part of recent news events. But see Mau v. Rio Grande Oil,
Inc., 28 F. Supp. 845 (N.D. Cal. 1939) (upholding a cause of action for invasion of privacy in
a radio dramatization of a robbery shortly after the incident); Harms v. Miami Daily News,
Inc., 127 So. 2d 715 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1961) (invasion of privacy from a local columnist's
description of plaintiffs telephone voice as "sexy"). Commentators suggest name identifica-
tion of a person involved in a newsworthy event may not always be necessary for adequate
coverage and would therefore unjustifiably expose the individual's private life. Nimmer, The
Right to Speak from Times to Time: First Amendment Theory Applied to Libel and Misap-
plied to Privacy, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 935, 966-67 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Nimmer]; Frank-
lin, supra note 23, at 126-27. In some instances, the name of a rape victim may not be
Recent Decisions
Cox IN LIGHT OF PRIOR SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
The Supreme Court has expressly dealt with the right of privacy
twice; both cases involved publicity which placed the plaintiff in a
false light before the public.47 In Time, Inc. v Hill,4" the Court con-
sidered a statutory cause of action against a publisher who had
reported the opening of a Broadway play based on a widely circu-
lated news event in which plaintiff and his family were held hostage
by escaped convicts. Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co.4" in-
volved the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a verdict against a
newspaper for a story depicting the poverty of the family of a victim
of a bridge collapse. In both cases, the Court applied the New York
Times defamation standard: if matters of public interest had been
reported, the plaintiff had to show publication with knowledge of
the falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth." This standard was
appropriate because in both Hill and Cantrell the publications were
false; hence, the law of privacy prior to Cox overlapped the law of
defamation *'
After Hill, the Court applied the "actual malice" standard to
defamation actions brought by private individuals involved in
"matters of general concern. '"52 This extension of the New York
Times standard was retracted in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 3 The
Court found the legitimate state interest in protecting the reputa-
tions of private persons equalled first amendment values; so long as
states do not impose liability without fault, they may use a lesser
standard of negligence than knowing or reckless falsity. 54 Gertz criti-
necessary to tell the story. Id. at 121. The problem is how and when a publisher can determine
whether "adequate coverage" requires the name. Id. at 126-27. See notes 65 & 67 and accom-
panying text infra. Name identification would seem crucial in reporting a recent news event,
to inform the public of community affairs and to allow witnesses to come forward regarding
the incident. A. FRIENDLY & R. GOLDFARB, CRIME AND PuBLIcrrY, THE IMPACT OF NEWS ON THE
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 42-45 (1967).
47. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (Tent. Draft No. 13, 1967).
48. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
49. 419 U.S. 245 (1974).
50. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
51. Commentators have suggested false light invasion of privacy and injury to reputation
are conceptually alike, since both involve publication of a falsehood. Privacy, supra note 29,
at 398-401; Wade, Defamation and the Right of Privacy, 15 VAND. L. REV. 1093 (1962). Contra,
Nimmer, supra note 46, at 961-63.
52. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971) (news broadcast referred to
plaintiff as "smut dealer").
53. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
54. Id. at 347.
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cized the "matter of general concern" test because it encompassed
everything which was newsworthy.5 5 Cox, however, retained the
"public interest" standard with regard to privacy actions despite
the Court's recognition that the public interest was too broad and
vague a standard to be meaningful in defamation actions. In Gertz,
the Court specifically limited its discussion of public versus private
figures to situations where a person voluntarily places himself in the
public light;56 conversely, in invasion of privacy cases a person gen-
erally becomes the subject of media coverage through no purposeful
act of his own.57 Perhaps because privacy and defamation actions
serve different functions, the Court did not discuss Gertz in Cox, but
rather relied on the rationale that the public has a legitimate inter-
est in matters contained in open governmental records.5" Cox did not
reach the question of how to determine whether information is in the
public interest, since under the public records rationale the state
had already done so by making records open or accessible. Since Hill
indicates the public has a legitimate interest in events other than
those concerned merely with the operations of government, the defi-
nitional standard of public interest has been left to future cases.
This vacuum may cause confusion in the lower courts. Cox leaves
open the question whether truth is a constitutionally required de-
fense in a privacy action where the information is accurate but is
not obtained from a government record open to the general public.59
55. 14 DUQ. L. REV. 89, 98 (1975).
56. 418 U.S. at 345.
57. See notes 41 & 42 and accompanying text supra.
58. 420 U.S. at 491-92. A more difficult situation may be presented where a news medium
uses public records as a starting point for its own investigation of an individual's private life
and publishes matter from the public record and its own investigation. Assuming the inde-
pendent matter is "rationally related" to material on the record, its publication would also
be privileged. Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229 (1972) (allegedly obscene material was ration-
ally related to protected expressions on scientific matters). See also Aquino v. Bulletin Co.,
190 Pa. Super. 528, 535-36, 154 A.2d 422, 427 (1959) (where marriage and divorce records were
the basis for a narrative feature story, preventing publication of details would constitute an
unwarranted interference with the right of the press to disseminate news).
If, however, Cox is narrowly read to permit publication only of material actually on the
public record, the service performed by the press in a free society would be seriously
diminished. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 389 (1967). When the press can go beyond mere
recordation of public records, it can fulfill the expectation values of a free press. See Bernstein
v. National Broadcasting Co., 129 F. Supp. 817 (D.D.C. 1955), afj'd, 232 F.2d 369 (D.C. Cir.
1956) (newspaper reporter independently investigating testimony given at a murder trial
uncovered new evidence that helped exonerate the defendant).
59. 420 U.S. at 491. This situation may occur in crimes such as rape where the victim is
treated at a private hospital.
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Language in Gertz which was cited by Justice Powell in Cox" sug-
gests truth should be a defense.' Cox itself would support the view
that information in which the public has an interest should be
protected.2 That position corresponds with lower court decisions
which developed the newsworthiness standard to determine whether
there was sufficient public interest to warrant an invasion of pri-
vacy. 3 The fundamental problem with the public interest or news-
worthiness criteria, however, is that neither judges nor newsmen can
accurately guess what will be "news" on a given day." The Court
admitted this difficulty and its first amendment implications in
Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,15 when it said decisions
regarding publication and treatment of public issues were matters
of editorial judgment and control. Thus, although public interest
60. 420 U.S. at 499 (Powell, J. concurring), quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
323, 347 (1974).
61. Justice White's dissent in Gertz would have required that publishers prove the truth
of the defamatory statement. He criticized the Court's disapproval of liability without fault,
on the theory that anyone who publishes a statement that is false is never without fault in a
meaningful sense. 418 U.S. at 388-92 (White, J., dissenting). Thus, in the area of defamation,
Justices White and Powell agree that truth is a required defense.
62. 420 U.S. at 490.
63. See notes 36 & 37 and accompanying text supra.
64. A sample of newspapers from a given locale reveals each has an individual idea of what
constitutes a "newsworthy" event or fact. These differences, which would frustrate courts
attempting to second-guess editorial news judgment, were outlined in Jenkins v. Dell Publish-
ing Co., 251 F.2d 447 (3d Cir. 1958) in an attempt to define "news":
A large part of the matter which appears in newspapers and news magazines today
is not published or read for the value or importance of the information it conveys. Some
readers are attracted by shocking news. Others are titillated by sex in the news. Still
others are entertained by news which has an incongruous or ironic aspect. Much news
is in various ways amusing and for that reason of special interest to many people . ..
This may be a disturbing commentary upon our civilization, but it is nonetheless a
realistic picture of society.
Id. at 451. One commentator has concluded that the best definition of "newsworthy" is what
is in the media, and that the press by necessity must be the final arbiter. Kalven, supra note
30, at 336.
Another aspect of mass communications illustrates the impracticality of judicial review of
news editing. An editor's decision to publish, particularly in daily news media, must some-
times be made within minutes of publication; a judicial determination of newsworthiness
would be made over a prolonged period. As a result, it has been suggested that public opinion
and the consciences of newspaper publishers act as sufficient safeguards against occasional
abuses of privacy by the mass media without the need for a judicial or legal remedy. Z.
CHAFEE, GOVERNMENT AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS 137 (1947).
65. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
66. Id. at 258; accord, Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966) (state could not impose
criminal sanctions on the publication of material that did nothing more than urge voters to
support a referendum on election day).
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is a convenient catchall, it does not help the press or the courts to
determine what is a public issue.
CONCLUSION
By confining the issue in Cox to whether a privacy action may be
maintained where truthful information was obtained from. an open
government record, the Court has left unanswered questions for the
media and the public. The media may ask whether it may rely upon
the accuracy of public records or the truthfulness of public officials
purporting to convey information in the records. 7 Moreover, Cox
said nothing regarding the press's right to develop its own investiga-
tion to disclose additional facts not in the record. A more fundamen-
tal problem for advocates of a vigorous press is the Court's qualified
invitation to legislate against public documentation on the state
level .8 If states should respond with restrictive legislation, they may
protect privacy at the expense of informing the public of the nature
and extent of crime in their communities.69 On the other hand, if
the public interest standard is construed broadly, the public's appe-
tite for news may be satisfied at the expense of the individual's
desire for privacy.70
Joyce McKeever
67. This problem may be without real significance if the information is in the public
record and the publication accurately reflects the record. The key to a claim for invasion of
privacy in cases such as Cox is unwarranted disclosure of private facts by the defendant; since
the matter on the public record has already been disclosed, the publisher does nothing more
than disseminate the record. Bernstein v. National Broadcasting Co., 129 F. Supp. 817, 833
(D.D.C. 1955), aff'd, 232 F.2d 369 (D.C. Cir. 1956). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 652D, comment c at 114 (Tent. Draft No. 13, 1967).
68. 420 U.S. at 496. A number of states deny public access to records and proceedings
regarding juvenile crime. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 24-2432 (1971).
69. States could conceivably reconstruct rape laws so that certain proceedings would be
closed to the public. For example, preliminary hearings could determine whether placing the
victim's name on a public record would result in substantial certainty of further harm to the
victim, at least in the time before the defendant is brought to trial. But see note 46 supra.
See also State v. Evjue, 253 Wis. 146, 161-62, 33 N.W.2d 305, 312 (1948).
70. There is an alternative basis for invasion of privacy where the press by false impres-
sion, misrepresentation or simple trespass intrudes on private lives in an attempt to gather
news. See Metter v. Los Angeles Examiner, 35 Cal. App. 2d 304, 95 P.2d 491 (Dist. Ct. App.
1939) (allegations that a reporter broke into plaintiff's house to obtain a picture of a suicide
victim which was subsequently published). Such a rationale may be applicable where news
reporters physically intrude on the privacy of an individual after he has evidenced a desire
to be let alone. In such cases, the actionable grounds would not be publication per se, as
suggested by Warren & Brandeis, supra note 31, at 218, but would be publication plus action.
Cf. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968). See also Feinberg, Recent Develop-
ments in the Law of Privacy, 48 COLUM. L. REV. 713, 715 (1948).
